Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement

The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience

7 Moral Intuitions

moral judgments (see Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Cushman et al., 2006 proposes a similar view). This dichotomy in moral judgments seems analogous to subjects’ tendency to say that the baseline is crucial to probability when asked abstractly but then to overlook baseline percentages and focus solely on representativeness when asked to make a probability judgment in a concrete case. A correl...

Emotional Intuitions and Moral Play

Brosnan's research on chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys provides invaluable clues to unlocking the complex nature of human morality. Elaborating upon her claims, we explore the role of emotions in basic social interactions, social regulation processes, and morality, all of which may be crucial to both human and nonhuman communities. We then turn to a conceptualization of teasing and play as foru...

Disagreement, reliability, and resilience

Alex Worsnip has recently argued against conciliatory views that say that the degree of doxastic revision required in light of disagreement is a function of one’s antecedent reliability estimates for oneself and one’s disputant. According to Worsnip, the degree of doxastic revision is also sensitive to the resilience of these estimates; in particular, when one has positive “net resilience,” mea...

The Non-moral Basis of Cognitive Biases of Moral Intuitions

Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism....