Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day-by-day information on work plans, hours actually worked and delays, we find evidence of moral haza...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu002