Moral Hazard in Agricultural Yield Insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard , Insurance , and Some
We consider a model of insurance and collusion. EÆcient risk sharing requires the consumer to get a monetary compensation in case of a loss. But this in turn implies consumer-provider collusion incentives to submit false claims to the insurer. We assume, however, that only some providers are collusive while some are honest, and determine the optimal contract specifying the treatment, the insura...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Archives of Business Research
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2054-7404
DOI: 10.14738/abr.81.7753