Moral Hazard Heterogeneity: Genes and Health Insurance Influence Smoking after a Health Shock

Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance.

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, an...

Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance.

We study the existence of self-selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance industry. Dependent workers must purchase health insurance either from one public or several private insurance providers. For them, we analyze the relationship between health care services utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. In the case of independent workers, where there is n...

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance

Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets. We use claims data from a large firm to study the independent roles of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health insurance by assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, end-of-year price, average price, or a relate...

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?

Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but ...

Budgetary Systems and Moral Hazard in National Health Insurance and Long-term Care Insurance