Moral hazard, agency problem and ownership structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive agency with moral hazard.∗
Principals seek to enter a productive relationship with agents by posting general incentive contracts. A contract is exclusive and must solve both the ex post moral hazard and the ex ante competitive search problem (participation). Menus of contracts do not help hence (single) contract posting is optimal. Principal competition restores some bargaining power with the agents, to whom principals m...
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In this paper, we depict and analyze simple models of moral hazard, namely “operating moral hazard” and “investing moral hazard.” First we assume that a corporation exists primarily for the benefit of their shareholders. Then, moral hazard occurs when managers choose an option knowingly that is not optimum for shareholders. We evaluate the loss to shareholders in terms of cash flow to them in t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv3i2p12