Moral Emotions and Unnamed Wrongs: Revisiting Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic Injustice and Illness

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types o...

Epistemic injustice in psychiatry

It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice (a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject) than healthy people. This editorial claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory factors are outlined, global and sp...

The Nature of Epistemic Injustice

Moral emotions and moral behavior.

Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior. This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions. We first focus on a triad of negatively valenced "self-conscious" emotions-shame, guilt, and embarrassment. As in previous decades, much research remains focused on shame and guilt. We review cur...

Revisiting Epistemic Specifications

In 1991, Michael Gelfond introduced the language of epistemic specifications. The goal was to develop tools for modeling problems that require some form of meta-reasoning, that is, reasoning over multiple possible worlds. Despite their relevance to knowledge representation, epistemic specifications have received relatively little attention so far. In this paper, we revisit the formalism of epis...