Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00183-2