MONEY, SEARCH, AND COSTLY MATCHMAKING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Money, Search and Costly Matchmaking
I examine the robustness of monetary equilibria in a random matching model where a more efficient mechanism for trade is available. Agents choose between two trading sectors: the search and the intermediated sector. In the former, trade partners arrive randomly and there is a trading externality. In the latter a costly matching technology provides deterministic double-coincidence matches. Multi...
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Endogenous information structure is analyzed in a search model of production and exchange under qualitative uncertainty by allowing agents to invest in an inspection technology at a fixed cost where incurring a higher cost permits quality to be recognized with higher probability. In any equilibria where agents acquire information, some bad commodities are always produced. The information acquis...
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Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs that can be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential search among rms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new o¤ering. An o¤ering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extent to which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibri...
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Conict and appropriation are costly activities that are economically signi cant, yet the assumption of perfect and costless enforcement of property rights in much of economic research has limited their systematic study. Conict follows directly from the methodological principle of self-interest and taking it into account in modeling leads to very di¤erent ndings than in its absence: in straig...
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I study the ex-ante efficient allocation of a set of quality-heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality. The designer faces a trade-off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening, because the cost sustained is wasted. T...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Macroeconomic Dynamics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1365-1005,1469-8056
DOI: 10.1017/s1365100500016023