Mole calculations (Groves, Paul)

Undominated Groves Mechanisms

The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCGmechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. We co...

Research Statement : Daniel Groves

In the last few years, my research has been in geometric group theory, which attempts to understand groups via the spaces upon which they act. The last two decades have seen tremendous progress in our understanding of infinite discrete groups, and many longstanding open problems have been solved using geometric methods. I am particularly interested in coarse negative and non-positive curvature,...

Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms

A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents’ valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of Groves mechanisms achieves this; however, these mechanisms require the agents to make payments, thereby reducing the agents’ total welfare. In this paper we ...

Ernest William Hey Groves

Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms

Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mechanism’s Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced for the announced quadratic preferences. Tian (19...