Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders’ budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains.
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This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, nonwasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder’s valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second P...
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The existence of incentive-compatible, computationally-efficient protocols for combinatorial auctions with decent approximation ratios is one of the most central and well studied open questions in mechanism design. The only universal technique known for the design of truthful mechanisms is the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme, which is “maximal in range”, i.e., it always exactly op...
متن کاملAuctions with Budget Constraints
In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an additive function over the items. An auction with budget constraints is a common special case where bidders gene...
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The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2653970