Modern Sovereign Money—Part I: The Moral Hazard of Fractional Reserve Banking
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Identification of Moral Hazard in the Banking System of Iran
The presence of moral hazard in the banking sector can have worrying results. This paper examines the role of government guarantees to banks in generating moral hazard in Iran. We test for moral hazard among bank creditors by determining whether protected banks received more funds from creditors than non-protected banks. Empirically, to determine the existence of moral hazard among bank manag...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Open Journal of Social Sciences
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2327-5952,2327-5960
DOI: 10.4236/jss.2018.69007