Models, truth and realism: assessing Bas van Fraassen's views on scientific representation

Van Fraassen : Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

The notion of literal construal divides anti-realists into two kinds: the kind who say that science aims to be true when construed non-literally; and kind van Fraassen belongs to, who say that while theories should be literally construed, they don’t have to be true. The first kind of anti-realist might claim e.g. that the theory of phlogiston and the modern theory of combustion say the same thi...

Scientific Realism , the Galilean Strategy and Representation 1

This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher’s most recent epistemology of science, real realism. I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term “representation”, and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary ...

Scientific and Theological Realism

In this paper I shall explore the parallels and contrasts between scientific and theological realism. I shall start by providing an outline of the various aspects of scientific realism before looking at these in more detail and in comparison to theological realism. I hope that by this comparison with the well-developed debates between various species of scientific antirealists and realists, tha...

Inconsistency and scientific realism

I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, ...

Incommensurability and Scientific Realism