Modeling Two-Sided Matching Considering Agents’ Psychological Behavior Based on Regret Theory

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SAGE Open

سال: 2020

ISSN: 2158-2440,2158-2440

DOI: 10.1177/2158244020931899