Modeling Social Preferences: A Generalized Model of Inequity Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Modeling Social Preferences: A Generalized Model of Inequity Aversion
Taking note of the wide variety and growing list of models in the literature to explain patterns of behavior observed in laboratory experiments, this paper identifies two tests, the Variety Test (ability of a model to explain outcomes under variety or alternative scenarios) and the Psychological Test (ability of a model to conform to psychological intuition), that can be used to judge any model...
متن کاملHayat Khan Modeling Social Preferences: A Generalized Model of Inequity Aversion Economics and Econometrics Research Institute EERI
This paper argues that a generalized model of social preferences must simultaneously pass two tests; the Variety Test (explain outcomes under variety, the V-test) and the Psychological Test (conform to psychological intuition, the P-test). It is shown that none of the models proposed to date unconditionally passes these tests. The paper extends the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality-aversion ...
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Adults and children are willing to sacrifice personal gain to avoid both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity. These two forms of inequity aversion follow different developmental trajectories, with disadvantageous inequity aversion emerging around 4 years and advantageous inequity aversion emerging around 8 years. Although inequity aversion is assumed to be specific to situations where res...
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Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. Howe...
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We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki (2004), which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of the surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects’ production (libertarian principle). In our model, dictators may also account for the way in which the surplus wa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1428245