Modeling Attacker-Defender Interaction as a Zero-Sum Stochastic Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Computer Sciences and Applications
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2328-7268
DOI: 10.12691/jcsa-1-2-3