Model Checking Rational Agents

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Model Checking Rational Play

We show that the problem of model checking “ATLwith Plausibility” is ∆3 -complete. We consider two variants of the logic: one with abstract terms describing plausibility sets, and another one where plausibility assumptions are imposed through formulae of ATLI [19]. In both cases, the complexity results are the same.

متن کامل

Rational Verification: From Model Checking to Equilibrium Checking

Rational verification is concerned with establishing whether a given temporal logic formula φ is satisfied in some or all equilibrium computations of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behaviour φ under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the framework of rational verificat...

متن کامل

Model Checking Logics for Communicating Sequential Agents

We present a model checking algorithm for LCSA, a temporal logic for communicating sequential agents (CSAs) introduced by Lodaya, Ramanujam, and Thiagarajan. LCSA contains temporal modalities indexed with a local point of view of one agent and allows to refer to properties of other agents according to the latest gossip which is related to local knowledge. The model checking procedure relies on ...

متن کامل

Model Checking for PRS-Like Agents

The key problem in applying verification techniques such as model checking to agent architectures is to show how to map systematically from an agent program to a model structure that not only includes the possible behaviours of the agent in its environment, but which also captures appropriate mental notions, such as belief, desire and intention, that may be used by the designer to reason about ...

متن کامل

A Model of Boundedly Rational “Neuro” Agents

We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who mad...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Intelligent Systems

سال: 2004

ISSN: 1541-1672

DOI: 10.1109/mis.2004.47