M&M: Masks and Macs against Physical Attacks

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

سال: 2018

ISSN: 2569-2925

DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2019.i1.25-50