منابع مشابه
Complexity and Mixed Strategy Equilibria∗
We propose a theory of mixed strategies in zero-sum two-person games. Given a finite zero-sum two-person game g, we extend it to collective games g∞ and g∞,S, which are infinite repetitions of the game g. Players in the collective games are restricted to use computable strategies only, but each has a complex sequence that can be used in the computation. We adopt kolmogorov complexity to define ...
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One of the more convincing interpretations of mixed strategy equilibria describes a mixed equilibrium as a steady state in a large population in which all players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. To be complete, however, this interpretation requires a good story about how the population arrives at the appropriate distribution over pure strategies. In th...
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A rational agent in a multiagent world must decide on its actions based on the decisions it expects others to make, but it might believe that they in turn might be basing decisions on what they believe the initial agent will decide. Such reciprocal rationality leads to a nesting of models that can potentially become intractable. To solve such problems, game theory has developed techniques for d...
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A game in strategic form does not always have a Nash equilibrium in which each player deterministically chooses one of his strategies. However, players may instead randomly select from among these pure strategies with certain probabilities. Randomizing one’s own choice in this way is called a mixed strategy. A profile of mixed strategies is called a mixed equilibrium if no player can gain on av...
متن کاملConstruction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to su...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Canadian Journal of Economics
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0008-4085
DOI: 10.2307/135864