منابع مشابه
Mixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games
We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability o...
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We describe the Nash equilibria set as an intersection of best response graphs. The problem of Nash equilibria set construction for two-person mixed extended 2× 3 games is studied. Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 91A05, 91A06, 91A10, 91A43, 91A44.
متن کاملMixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Terminal-Reward Games
We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability o...
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In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of twoqubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium. PACS: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 87....
متن کاملNash equilibria sets in mixed extension of 2x2x2 games
We describe the Nash equilibria set as an intersection of graphs of players’ best responses. The problem of Nash equilibria set construction for three-person extended 2× 2× 2 games is studied. Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 90C05, 90C10, 90C29, 90C31.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.31009