Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
The focus of this paper is on developing verifiable sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of better-reply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is concerne...
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There are games with a unique Nash equilibrium but such that, for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the bestreply dynamics. MSC classification. Primary: 91A22 ; Secondary: 34A34, 34A60.
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A game in strategic form does not always have a Nash equilibrium in which each player deterministically chooses one of his strategies. However, players may instead randomly select from among these pure strategies with certain probabilities. Randomizing one’s own choice in this way is called a mixed strategy. A profile of mixed strategies is called a mixed equilibrium if no player can gain on av...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0478-5