Misrepresentation of Credence Goods and Channel Design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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credence goods market is one of the markets that the asymmetric information has transformed it to a missing market. those goods and services that the applicant cannot determine the exact amount of their expenses due to the asymmetric information are called credence goods. from the economists' perspective, transaction in a market where participants are ignorant about each other is a game wi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2552807