Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe

Abstract Evidentialism as an account of theoretical rationality is a popular and well-defended position. However, recently, it's been argued that misleading higher-order evidence (HOE) – is, about one's or cognitive functioning poses problem for evidentialism. Roughly, the that, in certain cases HOE, it appears evidentialism entails rational to adopt belief akratic conjunction proposition form “ p , but my doesn't support ” despite being case believing be clearly irrational. In this paper, I diffuse using distinction between propositional doxastic rationality. argue although can propositionally believe (according evidentialism), one cannot inferentially base evidence, and, thus, doxastically rationally possess belief. addition, address worry solution puzzle commits evidentialists possibility epistemic circumstances which proposition, (namely, conjunction), yet cannot, principle, (doxastically) . As demonstrate, HOE are not only types force accept does entail There no new problems raised by weren't already present involving purely first-order evidence.