MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE IRREGULARITIES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Modern Law Review
سال: 1978
ISSN: 0026-7961
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.1978.tb00793.x