Min–max–min robustness for combinatorial problems with discrete budgeted uncertainty

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics

سال: 2020

ISSN: 0166-218X

DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2020.07.011