Minmax and maxmin of repeated games with incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Minmax and Maxmin of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
For a class of 2-Person 0-sum repeated games with incomplete information, Aumann/Masch. ler 119671 and Stearns [1967] have given a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of v (the value of the infinitely repeated game). Mertens/Zamir [19711 and Mertens [1971/72] have given the formula (and thus proved the existence) of lim Vn, the limit of the values of the n . .+ ~ games with n r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1980
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01771426