Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense

A modest defense of manifestationalism

As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its obser...

Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology

I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively...

Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology SUSANNA

entities, we do not stand in awareness relations to concepts when we employ concepts. Moreover, on the notion of concepts in play, there cannot be a perceptual concept that has not been employed to refer to the very mind-independent objects or property-instances that the concept is of. Third, the view satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on i...

Commentary on Scott Aikin, “A Modest Defense of Fallacy Theory”

In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions

Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are in-between perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, ...