Mindreading in conversation

How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard models conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have mind. However, idea mindreading a pervasive feature challenged large body evidence suggesting mental state attribution slow taxing, at least when it deals with propositional attitudes such as beliefs. Belief attributions involve contents decoupled from our own primary representation reality; handling these has come to be seen signature full-blown mindreading. cooperative communication does not necessarily demand decoupling. We argue for theoretical empirical turn towards “factive” forms mentalizing here. In factive mentalizing, we monitor others do or know, without generating representations. propose model representational, cognitive, interactive components aims explain efficient real-time monitoring epistemic states conversation. After laying out this account, articulate more limited set conversational functions nonfactive including contexts meta-linguistic repair, deception, argumentation. conclude suggestions further research into roles played versus