Migration when Social Preferences are Ordinal: Steady-state Population Distribution and Social Welfare

Are social welfare functions ordinal or cardinal ?

Ordinal Nash Social Welfare Function

A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed based on risk preferences and assuming a common, worst social state for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterisation of the solution is a weak version of IIA, in which only the relative risk position with respect to the worst state is considered. Thus the resulting social preference takes into account non (necessarily) ...

Social Welfare Functions When Preferences Are Convex, Strictly Monotonic, and Continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings i restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives i R n, n > 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be con...

The ordinal Nash social welfare function

A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed. It is based on risk preferences and assumes a common, worst social tate (origin) for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterization of the function is a weak version of independence of rrelevant alternatives. This axiom considers relative risk positions with respect to the origin. Thus, the resulting social preference ak...

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