Microfinance Mission Drift?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions
Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI’s objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in propoor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the p...
متن کاملMicrofinance Games
Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. From a theoretical perspective, however, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. We created an experimental econo...
متن کاملThe Risk Of Microfinance Sudan Experience In Microfinance Higher Cost
The purpose of this research is to investigate and focus on the high cost of microfinance loans which are provided by banks. The high costs are one of the main problems, facing the microfinance programs in its persuit to help the poor and the low income households. This research followed the descriptive approach, to investigate the problem of this research. Questionnaires were used as the main ...
متن کاملExploitative Microfinance Interest Rates
The field of microfinance emerged in the developing world as a vehicle to provide financial services to poor segments of population is gradually being seen as a profitable business opportunity. In the initial stages of development, these activities were perceived to be done with a service agenda. As the micro finance institutions (MFIs) began to mature, they started facing performance dilemma, ...
متن کاملMicrofinance and Dynamic Incentives
Dynamic incentives, where incentives to repay are generated by granting access to future loans, is one of the methodologies used by microfinance institutions (MFIs). In this paper, I present a model of dynamic incentives where lenders are uncertain over how much borrowers value future loans. Loan terms are determined endogenously, and loans become more favorable as the probability of default be...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: World Development
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0305-750X
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.05.006