Microfinance and missing markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
The existing theoretical analysis of microfinance focuses on the nature loan contract such as group liability. We draw attention to role missing or imperfect labour markets in understanding some important “second generation” debates microfinance. Our helps explain a number puzzles including high repayment rates with interest rates, difficulties scaling up projects, limited economic impact borrowing households, low take-up recent microcredit programs, conflicting views about rate elasticity demand, and spurious mission drift. Microcredit can play when are underdeveloped, but it may also hinder structural transformation. Microfinancement et marchés inexistants. En matière de microfinancement, l’analyse théorique actuelle s’intéresse principalement à la du contrat prêt, notamment responsabilité collective. Afin comprendre les débats seconde génération relatifs au nous attirons l’attention sur le rôle que peut jouer un marché travail absent ou imparfait. Notre analyse permet d’expliquer certain nombre mystères liés taux remboursement élevés couplés aux d’intérêt élevés, difficultés développer des projets, retombées économiques limitées ménages emprunteurs , faibles participation dans programmes microfinancement récents, points vue contradictoires relativement conséquences l’élasticité demande microcrédit changement
منابع مشابه
Micronance and Missing Markets
The existing theoretical analysis of micro nance focuses on the nature of the loan contract such as group liability. We draw attention to the role of missing or imperfect labor market in understanding some of the important second generationdebates in micro nance. Our analysis helps explain a number puzzles in micro nance such as (i) high repayment rates with high interest rates, (ii) di¢ cult...
متن کاملMicrofinance and Dynamic Incentives
Dynamic incentives, where incentives to repay are generated by granting access to future loans, is one of the methodologies used by microfinance institutions (MFIs). In this paper, I present a model of dynamic incentives where lenders are uncertain over how much borrowers value future loans. Loan terms are determined endogenously, and loans become more favorable as the probability of default be...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0008-4085', '1540-5982']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12502