Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversifi cation and Loan Take-Up
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Export Diversifi cation and Economic Growth
www.growthcommission.org [email protected] Commission on Growth and Development Montek Ahluwalia Edmar Bacha Dr. Boediono Lord John Browne Kemal Derviş Alejandro Foxley Goh Chok Tong Han Duck-soo Danuta Hübner Carin Jämtin Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski Danny Leipziger, Vice Chair Trevor Manuel Mahmoud Mohieldin Ngozi N. Okonjo-Iweala Robert Rubin Robert Solow Michael Spence, Chair Sir K....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2783273