Metaphysical Dogmatism, Humean Scepticism, Kantian Criticism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does Kantian mental content externalism help metaphysical realists?
Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a 1 commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by con2 ditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God 3 idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of rep4 resentation and cognitive significance have been able to show that K...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Kantian Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1369-4154,2044-2394
DOI: 10.1017/s1369415400002260