منابع مشابه
Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism
Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysic...
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I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of conceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of) our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our know...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0165-0106,1572-8420
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0088-3