منابع مشابه
Agency and Mental Causation
A self or person does not appear to be identifiable with his or her organic body, nor with any part of it, such as the brain; and yet selves seem to be agents, capable of bringing about physical events (such as bodily movements) as causal consequences of certain of their conscious mental states. How is this possible in a universe in which, it appears, every physical event has a sufficient cause...
متن کاملMental Mechanisms, Autonomous Systems, and Moral Agency
Mechanistic explanations of cognitive activities are ubiquitous in cognitive science. Humanist critics often object that mechanistic accounts of the mind are incapable of accounting for the moral agency exhibited by humans. We counter this objection by offering a sketch of how the mechanistic perspective can accommodate moral agency. We ground our argument in the requirement that biological sys...
متن کاملGrounding power on actions and mental attitudes
The main objective of this work is to develop a logic called IAL (Intentional Agency Logic) in which we can reason about mental states of agents, action occurrences, and agentive and group powers. IAL will be exploited for a formal analysis of different forms of power such as an agent i’s power of achieving a certain result and an agent i’s power over another agent j (alias social power).
متن کاملThe Relation between Geometry and Time in Mental Actions
Mental imagery is a cognitive tool that helps humans take decisions by simulating past and future events. The hypothesis has been advanced that there is a functional equivalence between actual and mental movements. Yet, we do not know whether there are any limitations to its validity even in terms of some fundamental features of actual movements, such as the relationship between space and time....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Philosophy and Psychology
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1878-5158,1878-5166
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0289-5