Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot social dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that individuals keep track of their past interactions and find the right response. However, there are natural b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1621239114