Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as “equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves”. We provide a syntactic and semantic characterization of perfect recall ∗I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful a...
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Given a game in extensive form and a player p in the game, we want to find a small set of parameters describing a set M of mixed strategies with the property that every mixed strategy for p has an equivalent mixed strategy in M. In the case that the player has perfect recall, behavioral strategies describe such a set. [2] For computational purposes, it is more useful to work with corresponding ...
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Games with imperfect information are an interesting and important class of games. They include most card games (e.g., bridge and poker), as well as many economic and political models. Here, we investigate algorithms for solving imperfect information games expressed in their extensive (game-tree) form. In particular, we consider algorithms for the simplest form of solution | a pure-strategy equi...
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The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), are explicitly restricted their analysis to games with perfect recall. In spite of this the concepts are well defined, exactl...
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Games with imperfect information are an interesting and important class of games. They include most card games (e.g., bridge and poker) as well as many economic and political models. Here we investigate algorithms for finding the simplest form of a solution (a pure-strategy equilibrium point) to imperfect information games expressed in their extensive (game tree) form. We introduce to the artif...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.002