MEMINIMALISIR RESIKO MORAL HAZARD PADA PEMBIAYAAN MUDHARABAH DI KOPERASI SYARIAH NURI JAWA TIMUR (KSN JATIM) PLAKPAK KECAMATAN PEGANTENAN PAMEKASAN
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Simple Models of Operating Moral Hazard and Investing Moral Hazard
In this paper, we depict and analyze simple models of moral hazard, namely “operating moral hazard” and “investing moral hazard.” First we assume that a corporation exists primarily for the benefit of their shareholders. Then, moral hazard occurs when managers choose an option knowingly that is not optimum for shareholders. We evaluate the loss to shareholders in terms of cash flow to them in t...
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We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contras...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IQTISHADIA: Jurnal Ekonomi & Perbankan Syariah
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2442-3076,2354-7057
DOI: 10.19105/iqtishadia.v2i2.866