Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful

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چکیده

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Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

سال: 2009

ISSN: 1076-9757

DOI: 10.1613/jair.2621