Mechanisms for information elicitation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanisms for information elicitation
We study the computational aspects of information elicitation mechanisms in which a principal attempts to elicit the private information of other agents using a carefully selected payment scheme based on proper scoring rules. Scoring rules, like many other mechanisms set in a probabilistic environment, assume that all participating agents share some common belief about the underlying probabilit...
متن کاملInformation elicitation and sequential mechanisms
This paper further studies a model of information elicitation due to Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz [13], where the introduction of sequential mechanisms results in more efficiency than the classical simultaneous mechanism design approach entails. Whereas the original work focused on anonymous function and settings where information is distributed independently across agents we extend the results ...
متن کاملAn Information Theoretic Framework For Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling
Information elicitation mechanisms, such as Peer Prediction [11] and Bayesian Truth Serum [12], are designed to reward agents for honestly reporting their private information, even when this information cannot be directly verified. Information elicitation mechanisms, such as these, are cleverly designed so that truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. However, a key challenge that h...
متن کاملInformation elicitation for decision making
Proper scoring rules, particularly when used as the basis for a prediction market, are powerful tools for eliciting and aggregating beliefs about events such as the likely outcome of an election or sporting event. Such scoring rules incentivize a single agent to reveal her true beliefs about the event. Othman and Sandholm [16] introduced the idea of a decision rule to examine these problems in ...
متن کاملInformation Elicitation Sans Verification
The recent advent of human computation — employing groups of non-experts to solve problems — has motivated study of a question in mechanism design: How do we elicit useful information when we are unable to verify reports? Existing methods, such as peer prediction and Bayesian truth serum, require assumptions either on the mechanism’s knowledge about the participants or on the information struct...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005