Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, nonwasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder’s valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second P...
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I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders’ budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains.
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In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an additive function over the items. An auction with budget constraints is a common special case where bidders gene...
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Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cuts revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be bene cial to the auctioneer. We show that the revenue of Sort-Cut can be an or...
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Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction where participants have affiliated valuations and private budget constraints; that is, bidders have private multidimensional types. This article investigates the existence and nature of monotone equilibria in this setting. Hard budget constraints introduce two competing effects on bidding. The direct effect depresses bids as participants hit their spend...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2651991