Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization based on the familiar Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule. These conditions pin down the rang...
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The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.014