Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application to Bilateral Trade
This paper studies mechanism design when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers. The rst result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be implementable. The condition combines an inequality version of the standard envelope characterization of payo¤s in quasilinear environments with an approach for relating maxmin agents subjective expected utilities to their ob...
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Invoking the parametrized distribution formulation of agency theory, the paper develops axiomatic foundations of the principal’s and agent’s choice behaviors that are representable by the maximization of the minimum expected utility over actiondependent sets of priors. In the context of this model, the paper also discusses some implications of uncertainty aversion for the design of optimal ince...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te2089