Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: E±ciency and Full Surplus Extraction
Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals, or types, of all agents. Previous literature has implicitly assumed that agents cannot observe their payo®s from a decision and has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals e±cient design is impossible. This paper shows that if an agent observes his own decision payo®, then it is always possible to ̄nd...
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We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multidimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0104-8