Mechanism design in queueing problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems
A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truthtelling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear cost queueing models are first best implementable. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost st...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/pl00004107