Mechanism Design for Demand Management in Energy Communities

We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, which several users obtain from external organization such as company and pay for the according to pre-specified prices that consist of time-dependent price per unit well separate peak demand. Since users’ utilities are their private information, they may not be willing share, mediator, known planner, is introduced help optimize overall satisfaction community (total utility minus total payments) by mechanism design. A consists message space, tax/subsidy, allocation function each user. Each user reports chosen her own then receives some amount determined function, pays tax specified function. desirable induces game, Nash equilibria (NE), results coincides with optimal community. As starting point, we design properties full implementation, strong budget balance individual rationality both planner. modify this baseline communities where exchanges allowed only within neighborhoods, consequently, tax/subsidy functions messages neighbors. All preserved distributed mechanism. Finally, present learning algorithm mechanism, based on projected gradient descent, guaranteed converge NE induced game.