Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling
Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed an...
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We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time – P | rj | ∑ wjCj in the classical notation of [5] – from a new perspective: We assume a strategic setting, where the data of each job, namely its release date rj , its processing time pj and its weight wj is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. Further...
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This work concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms, and study t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0030-364X,1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1090.0732