Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the mechanism design problem where planner can observe ex-post first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. contrast this with has ex-ante information regarding
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1434-4742', '1434-4750']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4