Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it to the 1995–1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders cannot exchange licenses in a way that incre...
متن کاملEstimation of Bidder Valuations in an FCC Spectrum Auction
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses auctions to allocate radio spectrum frequencies to wireless service providers. The innovation of the auction design is that it o¤ers many heterogeneous licenses simultaneously in one ascending auction. This paper develops an empirical model and procedure to estimate bidder valuations. Given that the complex nature of the auction does not admit fo...
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We introduce FAucS, a software testbed for studying automated agent bidding strategies in simulated auctions, specifically the United States FCC wireless frequency spectrum auctions. In addition to the complexity of these auctions, which provides ample opportunities for intelligent approaches to bidding, this type of auction has huge commercial importance, each bringing in billions of dollars t...
متن کاملThe Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions
From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? Did they award the licenses to the firms best able to turn the spectrum into valuable services for consumers? There is substantial evidence that t...
متن کاملComments on Experimental Design for Evaluating FCC Spectrum Auction Alternatives
We are responding to Public Notice DA 05-1267, which seeks comment on the proposed experimental design to eva luate aspects of the FCC's alternative auction methods, both with and without package bidding. The experimental design is ambitious. Our main comment is that the effort will be more productive if there is more focus on elements for which past experience and existing knowledge does not p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100