Measuring competitive intensity in sports leagues
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive balance in sports leagues and the paradox of power
It is generally thought that competitive equilibrium in sports leagues involves too little competitive balance (the strong dominate the weak too mucha more even contest would be more attractive). However, it is possible to sow in a standard logit contest model that the reverse is true – the strong do not win “enough”i.e. more wins by the strong team would increase attendance or revenues. This i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2042-678X
DOI: 10.1108/sbm-10-2019-0090