Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic weighted voting games
We initiate the study of dynamic cooperative games—cooperative games where the characteristic function may change over time. We introduce two types of algorithmic problems for such games: computing a given solution concept at time t, and checking that a certain function of the game (e.g., the Shapley value of a given player or the value of the least core) remains within given bounds during time...
متن کاملReliability Weighted Voting Games
We examine agent failures in weighted voting games. In our cooperative game model, R-WVG, each agent has a weight and a survival probability, and the value of an agent coalition is the probability that its surviving members would have a total weight exceeding a threshold. We propose algorithms for computing the value of a coalition, finding stable payoff allocations, and estimating the power of...
متن کاملStructural Control in Weighted Voting Games
Inspired by the study of control scenarios in elections and complementing manipulation and bribery settings in cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce the notion of structural control in weighted voting games. We model two types of influence, adding players to and deleting players from a game, with goals such as increasing a given player’s Shapley–Shubik or probabilistic Penro...
متن کاملManipulating the Quota in Weighted Voting Games
Weighted voting games provide a popular model of decision making in multiagent systems. Such games are described by a set of players, a list of players’ weights, and a quota; a coalition of the players is said to be winning if the total weight of its members meets or exceeds the quota. The power of a player in such games is traditionally identified with her Shapley– Shubik index or her Banzhaf ...
متن کاملFalse-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A player’s power in such games is usually not directly proportional to his weight, and is measured by a power index, the most prominent among which are the Shapley–Shubik i...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9588-x